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 chapter 16 
commercial r elations: 
from adam smith to field 
experiments 1 
 m aria  p ia  p aganelli 
 Adam Smith is oft en referred to as the father of economics and as a promoter of free 
markets. In what follows, I let the fi rst claim stand and concentrate on the second: that 
Adam Smith is a promoter of free markets. In particular, I take for granted, with all the 
necessary caveats, that Smith is a promoter of free markets (but cf. e.g.  Fleischacker  2004 ; 
 McLean  2006 ) and concentrate on how Smith promotes free markets. Smith promotes 
free markets for at least two reasons: effi  ciency and morality. Th ere is already a vast and 
detailed literature on the economic effi  ciency of the markets Smith describes. Here 
I focus on the claim that Smith promotes free markets on moral grounds and argues that 
markets can foster morality just as much as morality can foster markets. 
 Th e analysis bears on current debates in at least three ways. First, moral constraints in 
market transactions tend to reduce transaction costs. Morality is a cheaper means to 
enforce contracts than formal enforcement mechanisms. A better understanding of the 
relations between markets and morals may allow us better to understand some of the 
dynamics of economic growth today. Secondly, analysing both costs and benefi ts of 
markets may help us debunk useless yet common stereotypes. Th e approach Smith uses 
may integrate some of the contemporary analysis and help us see more clearly some of 
the consequences of the presence of markets today. Th irdly, we may increase (or develop) 
our appreciation for the depth and breadth of the eighteenth-century scholarship, and 
Smith’s place in it, as well as for its relevance in today’s discourse. 
 1 Th anks to the Earhart Foundation, Trinity University, and Th e University of Glasgow for supporting 
this research. Th anks to the participants of the 2011 conference ‘Markets and Happiness’ for comments 
on an earlier draft  of this chapter. Th anks also to Tyler Cowen, Christopher Berry, and Craig Smith for 
comments and encouragement as well as the participants of NYU colloquium, in particular to Sandy 
Ikeda. 
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 Th e chapter starts with Smith’s analysis of how markets may foster some aspects of 
morality. For Smith, markets generate wealth which supports life for an increasing 
number of people. Markets generate institutions which support liberty. And markets 
generate the social conditions which facilitate moral impartiality. If life, liberty, and 
impartial judgments are considered values, as they are in Smith, then for Smith  markers 
support these aspects of virtuous behaviour. A section showing how in Smith morality 
fosters markets follows. If economic actors, such as the greedy great merchants and 
manufacturers, are not moral agents, then, Smith tells us, markets are impaired and 
may collapse, or at least they have negative consequences for the majority of the people. 
Additionally, as Smith is not a one-sided thinker, he sees the negative consequences of 
markets for some other aspects of morality. For Smith, wars, interest groups, ignorance, 
and irresponsibility are all morally corrupting results of markets, as described in the 
 following section. Th e fi nal section presents Smith’s claims as testable hypotheses. 
Findings from experimental economics seem to support Smith’s ideas that markets and 
some aspects of morality are dependent on each other, and in particular some results 
seem to bring to light that the causal eff ects of the relationship goes from markets to 
morality. My conclusions are therefore that Smith, while seeing both costs and benefi ts 
of markets, is a promoter of free markets not only on effi  ciency grounds but also on 
moral grounds. Morality is a necessary, but not suffi  cient, condition for markets. And 
markets are a fertile ground upon which some aspects of morality can develop. Given 
some experimental results, both from the fi eld and from the laboratory, Smith may be 
correct. 
 Markets fostering morality 
 Adam Smith argues in at least three ways commerce may foster some aspects of  morality. 
Commerce fosters some moral behaviours by off ering the means to behave morally, by 
off ering the institutional environment in which we can behave morally, and by off ering 
the social environment in which behave morally. 
 Th e  Wealth of Nations (WN) opens with the claim that commercial societies foster 
certain aspects of moral conducts. If the preservation and the support of life are virtuous 
values, commerce facilitates their presence, because commerce generates wealth. 
For Smith, commerce allows poverty-stuck people to improve their material conditions. 
Th is is good because poverty is the cradle of heinous crimes ( Young  1992 ). In Smith’s 
account, poverty forces people to kill young children, the old, and the sick, either directly 
or indirectly. Smith indeed tells us that when a country is poor, ‘from mere want, they 
are frequently reduced, or at least they think they are reduced, to the necessity some-
times of directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning their infants, their old peo-
ple, and those affl  icted with lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be devoured 
by wild beasts’ (WN introduction 4: 10). Th e horrid practice of infanticide, Smith repeats 
later on, is a direct consequence of poverty.
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 Th e poverty of the lower ranks of people in China far surpasses that of the most 
beggarly nations in Europe. In the neighbourhood of Canton many hundred, it is 
commonly said, many thousand families have no habitation on the land, but live 
constantly in little fi shing boats upon the rivers and canals. Th e subsistence which 
they fi nd there is so scanty that they are eager to fi sh up the nastiest garbage thrown 
overboard from any European ship. Any carrion, the carcase of a dead dog or cat, for 
example, though half putrid and stinking, is as welcome to them as the most whole-
some food to the people of other countries. Marriage is encouraged in China, not by 
the profi tableness of children, but by the liberty of destroying them. In all great 
towns several are every night exposed in the street, or drowned like puppies in the 
water. (WN I.viii.24: 89–90) 
 In  Th e Th eory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) Smith repeats the claim that poverty induces 
immoral and actually unnatural behaviour such as infanticide. Poverty kills and makes 
people kill (TMS V.2.15: 209–10 cf. Rousseau and Smith’s review of Rousseau in EPS. 
For a full discussion see  Hont and Ignatieff   1983 ). 
 For Smith, commerce, on the other hand, lets people live. Commerce allows people to 
be more humane and less brutal because it generates wealth to support life. For Smith 
supporting life is moral and, to use contemporary economist’s parlance, it is a normal 
good subject to an income eff ect. Th e wealthier one is, or a society is, the cheaper it is, in 
relative terms, to be engaged in some moral behaviours, such as supporting life. 
According to Smith, in commercial societies, infanticide is abandoned and looked upon 
with horror. In commercial societies, one is rich enough to aff ord children and avoid 
morally repulsive actions dictated by exigency. In his ‘Introduction and Plan of the 
Work’ Smith argues that in commercial societies:
 though a great number of people do not labour at all … yet the produce of the whole 
labour of the society is so great, that all are oft en abundantly supplied, and a work-
man, even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and industrious, may enjoy 
a greater share of the necessaries and conveniences of life than it is possible for any 
savage to acquire. (WN introduction.4: 10) 
 Smith repeats the same point at the end of the fi rst chapter of WN, where he compares 
an African King, a European prince and a European peasant. Th e conveniences of life, 
which support the life of a European peasant are not much less than the ones enjoyed by 
a European prince, but they far exceed those of an African king (WN I.i.11: 24). With the 
exception of ancient Greeks, whom Smith characterizes as having ‘the most unjust and 
unreasonable conduct’ because they keep following the ancient barbaric custom incon-
gruent with their more refi ned status (TMS V.2.15: 210), commerce prevents ‘so dreadful 
a violation of humanity’ (TMS V.2.15: 210) as infanticide. Commerce provides resources 
to maintain children and the sick and infi rm, and the preservation and multiplication 
of life is morally good. Smith promotes commerce on moral grounds because some 
 morally desirable outcomes, such as the preservation and support of life, are a result of 
commerce (see  Otteson  2002 ). 
 Smith off ers us a moral defence of commerce because commerce allows morality the 
space to fl ourish. Commerce lets people live. But this is not enough. An increasing 
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number of people alive and enslaved seems to be better than a decreasing number of 
people alive and enslaved. But an increasing number of people alive and free is even 
 better. And, Smith argues, this is what commerce does. Not only is commerce conducive 
to morality because it lets more people live, but it is conducive to morality because it 
allows more people to live freely, through a set of institutions which foster liberty. 
 Non-commercial societies are characterized by personal relationships. For Smith 
personal relationships can imply dependence and therefore servitude. Indeed, personal 
relationships can easily be tyrannical. Commercial societies are characterized by 
impersonal relationships. In Smith, impersonal relationships imply independence and 
therefore freedom. 2 Th e African king, who is worse off  than the European peasant, is 
also ‘the absolute master of the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked savages’ (WN 
I.i.11: 24). Th e European peasant is instead a free man, living under the protection of 
the rule of law. 
 Smith describes in detail how commerce brings about individual as well as institu-
tional liberty in Book III of WN. Th ere, Smith analyzes the fall of feudalism and the 
advent of commercial societies. He claims that ‘the least observed [yet]  by far the most 
important of all [the] eff ects’ of commerce is the development and fostering of liberty 
(WN III.iv.4: 412, emphasis added). Indeed, ‘Commerce and manufacturers gradually 
introduced order and good government, and with them the liberty and security of indi-
viduals, among the inhabitants of the country, who had before lived almost in a contin-
ual state of war with their neighbours, and of servile dependency upon their superiors’ 
(WN III.iv.4: 412). Commerce therefore generates the ‘regular administration of justice’, 
institutionalizing rules of cooperation, fostering commercial prosperity and liberty 
( Rosenberg  1990 ;  Prasch  1991 ;  Rasmussen  2006 ;  Smith  2010 ). 
 In feudal societies, for Smith, where commerce is eff ectively absent, the great land-
owners can spend the products of their land only on ‘rustick hospitality at home’ (WN 
III.iv.5: 413). Th is means they support hundreds or thousands of men, as there is nothing 
else on which they can use their produce. ‘[A great proprietor] is at all times, therefore, 
surrounded by a multitude of retainers and dependants, who having no equivalent to 
give in return for their maintenance, but being fed entirely by his bounty, must obey 
him, for the same reason that soldiers must obey the prince who pays them’ (WN III.iv.5: 
413). Lack of commerce, for Smith, implies servility. 
 When commercial societies are slowly introduced the ‘masters of mankind’ fi nd 
something diff erent on which to spend their rents. Rather than sharing their rents with 
their dependants, they can now spend them all on themselves, buying ‘trinkets and bau-
bles’. And they do. ‘For a pair of diamond buckles perhaps, or for something as frivolous 
and useless’ feudal lords trade away their power and authority,  de facto freeing their 
dependants from servitude (WN III.iv.10: 418–19). Commerce requires monetized 
transactions. And monetized transactions are impersonal transactions; they break the 
 2 Smith presents also other kinds of relationships such as friendship and familiar relations, but these 
tend to remain relatively stable in the diff erent stages of development. Th anks to Christopher Berry for 
pointing this out to me. 
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personal ties between masters and servant. Smith tells us that masters are now custom-
ers, and servants are now tradesmen and artifi cers. It is true that the former master still 
feeds the former servants, but it is also true that the former servants ‘are more or less 
independent of him, because generally they can all be maintained without him’ (WN III.
iv.11: 420). Smith provides here another moral justifi cation for commerce: commerce 
generates freedom. Indeed, tradesmen and artifi cers now have not one but a thousand 
 masters, which means they are ‘not absolutely dependent upon any one of them’ (WN 
III.iv.12: 420). 
 Smith’s moral justifi cations of commerce, as we saw, are that commerce generates the 
resources to be more moral and it generates the freedom to be more moral. Th e third 
Smithian moral justifi cation of commerce is that commerce fosters some aspects of 
moral development, perhaps most importantly, through facilitating the development of 
impartiality ( Paganelli  2010 ). One can think of moral development as an enhanced 
capacity to exercise impartiality in our judgments. Moral actions are based on moral 
judgment and a moral judgment is an impartial judgment of what is appropriate in 
 specifi c situations (see Fricke in this volume). 
 In Part III of TMS, Smith explains that impartiality is what allows us to be virtuous and 
therefore moral. Impartiality is not innate, but acquired. We are born with the potential 
of becoming impartial, but we become impartial only through a long process of practice. 
Smith explains the development of impartiality by explaining how we learn to perceive 
distance (TMS III.iii: 134–56). Th e perception of distance is not innate, but learned. What 
is innate is the capability of perception of distance. It is only with experience that we then 
learn to perceive distances correctly ( Levy  1995 ). 
 So Smith tells us:
 In my present situation an immense landscape of lawns, and woods, and distant 
mountains, seems to do no more than cover the little window which I write by, and 
to be out of all proportion less than the chamber in which I am sitting. I can form a 
just comparison between those great objects and the little objects around me, in no 
other way, than by transporting myself, at least in fancy, to a diff erent station, from 
hence I can survey both at nearly equal distances, and thereby form some judgment 
of their real proportions. Habit and experience have taught me to do this so easily 
and so readily, that I am scarce sensible that I do it. (TMS III.3.2: 135) 
 Th e perception of distance is therefore learned. 
 Just like we need to put two objects at the appropriate distance from each other to 
compare dimensions, to see an object clearly, we need to put it at the right distance, that 
is, not too close and not too far away from our eyes. According to Smith, something that 
is close to our eyes appears much bigger than it is. Something that is far away from our 
eyes appears much smaller than it is. Th at is to say, the perception of something that is 
too close to us is biased. Th e object appears deformed in its ‘bigness’. On the other hand, 
the perception of something that is too far away is also biased. Th e object appears 
deformed in its ‘smallness’. Something big may look small simply because it is far away. 
Something small looks big simply because it is very close. 
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 Smith argues what is true for a physical object is also true for passions. According to 
Smith, ‘as to the eye of the body, objects appear great or small, not so much according to 
their real dimensions, as according to the nearness or distance of their situation; so 
do they likewise to what may be called the natural eye of the mind’ (TMS III.3.2: 134–5). 
So, if something happens close to us, we give it much more importance than if the same 
thing happens far away from us. And the closer to us, the more importance we give it, 
and vice-versa. Something close to us seems big. Something far away from us seems 
small. Th is implies that a small personal trouble will appear to our eyes much more 
tragic, much bigger, than a large catastrophe far away from us. Or that a small personal 
success gives us more joy than a distant immense positive event (TMS III.3.3: 135). 
 Following Smith, this natural propensity is a problem for moral judgment and con-
sequently for moral behaviour. If I perceive what is close to me to be much bigger than 
it actually is, a harm done to me will be seen as much more damaging than if the same 
harm is done to someone I do not know. Similarly, a good deed towards me is perceived 
as much more deserving than if done to an unknown stranger (see also Hume 2002: 219). 
So, I think that everything that happens to me is much more signifi cant than it actually 
is. So much so that if I know I will lose my little fi nger tomorrow, tonight I would not be 
able to sleep. While if I know the entire population of China will die in an earthquake 
tomorrow, I will snore placidly through the night (TMS III.3.4: 136). But Smith explains 
that this is not the whole story. Humans are not only born with some vision problems 
due to their self-love, but also with corrective glasses (see also Hobbes [1651] 1991: 129). 
Just like we are able to learn that the moon is bigger than the thumb which covers it, 
we are also able to learn that someone’s problems or joys may be bigger and more 
 relevant than ours, and that behaving thinking otherwise may not be good (TMS 
III.3.4–7: 136–9). 
 For Smith, as social animals, we are equipped with the ability to put ourselves in the 
place of another and to imagine how we would feel if we were them. We are also equipped 
with the desire to be loved and not hated. According to Smith, when I meet you, I see 
your aversion to my ego-centrism. I do not want you to dislike me. To the contrary, 
I want you to like me and approve of me. To do so, I learn that I have to ‘adjust the pitch 
of my passions’ to make them more acceptable to you. How do I know? Because that is 
the lesson of my exposure to the actions and reactions of my fellows. When I see you 
reacting to something that happens to you, I may think your passions are excessive, out 
of proportion. Th is is why I do not approve of them. If I were you, Smith tells us, I would 
be aware of the eff ect of my actions on others and not react that strongly. Th is then recip-
rocally makes me realize that this is why you do not approve of me when you see me 
reacting to a specifi c situation. So, in anticipation, I adjust the pitch of my passions so 
that you will approve of me, just as you adjust the pitch of your passions to appeal to me 
(TMS I.i.1–4: 9–23). 
 For Smith, therefore, the presence of others allows us to understand that our judg-
ment towards ourselves is biased because we are too close to ourselves. Th e presence of 
others, given our ability to put ourselves in the place of others and see how we would 
react if we were them looking at ourselves, helps us overcome our biases and try to 
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develop a more socially acceptable behaviour. Th anks to the presence of others we learn 
the appropriate behaviour in a specifi c situation. According to Smith, this is the fi rst step 
towards the development of impartiality and morality. 
 Th e second step towards the development of impartiality and morality, according to 
Smith, is the kind of others with whom we are interacting. Smith explains not all others 
are created equal in the process of our moral development. Th e closer the other is to us 
the less eff ective the other is in our development of impartiality (see also Hume 2002: 
350). Family members or close friends are too close to us. Th ey are more likely to let us 
indulge in our passions. People on the other side of the planet, similarly, are too far away 
for us to care. We are still left  indulging in our passions. Th e strength of our passions is 
not proper, given the circumstances. Strangers whom we meet face to face, though, are 
the right kind of others for our moral development. For Smith, strangers are far enough 
from us to be unbiased in their judgment and are close enough for us to care (TMS 
III.3.38–41: 153–4). 
 Say we suff er a great personal tragedy. If we meet a family member or a friend, Smith 
tells us, we will let out the intensity of our passions. With them, our distress is big because 
it is close to us. And our relatives or close friends are, well, close. So they also see this 
event as big (even if smaller than we do). Th ey will let us indulge in our passions. On the 
other hand, for Smith, we would unlikely display our feelings with the same intensity 
with a stranger. Th ey would think it would be quite bizarre if we did it. And we know it. 
So if we have to meet a stranger, we control our passions. And even if this is fake at the 
beginning, eventually we will feel better than if we stayed all day in the solitude of our 
room. According to Smith, we have adjusted the pitch of our passions to appeal to others 
and made ourselves morally stronger (TMS I.i.4.9: 22–3, VI.iii: 237–64). Th ese are some 
of Smith’s words describing this process. Th eir power is worth citing:
 In solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves: we are apt to 
over-rate the good offi  ces we may have done, and the injuries we may have suff ered: 
we are apt to be too much elated by our own good, and too much dejected by our 
own bad fortune. Th e conversation of a friend brings us to a better, that of a stranger 
to a still better temper. . . . Are you in adversity? Do not mourn in the darkness of 
solitude, do not regulate your sorrow according to the indulgent sympathy of your 
intimate friends; return, as soon as possible, to the day-light of the world and of 
society. Live with strangers, with those who know nothing, or care nothing about 
your misfortune (TMS III.3.38–9: 153–4). 
 Th is adjustment of the pitch of our passions is our learning the size of our fortunes and 
misfortunes. And, for Smith, our best teachers are strangers. Th e disapproval of others, 
of strangers in particular, to our reactions teaches us that our passions are too big because 
we are too close. If we see what happened to us from their point of view, from some dis-
tance, we would see that it is not that big. If we see ourselves as a stranger sees us, we see 
how bias our judgment is. If we see ourselves from the distance others see us, we would 
be able to be more impartial in our judgment towards ourselves. We would be able to 
see the right size. For Smith, the continuous interaction with strangers is a continuous 
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training for our self-command and therefore our impartiality. By practising adjusting 
our passions to the appropriate pitch, we eventually more easily adjust them. Eventually 
we will be able to moderate the pitch of our ego-centric passions to what an impartial 
spectator would judge as appropriate even in the physical absence of others. We become 
so accustomed to see ourselves with the eyes of another, that we do not need the physical 
other any longer to do it. In Smith’s account, with our imagination, trained by practice, 
we split ourselves into two and become at the same time the actor and the spectator of 
our actions. When this happens we are able to be impartial in our judgment of ourselves 
regarding the propriety of our passions. When this happens we act morally (TMS III, 
1–2: 109–34). 
 Th e others that matter the most for our development of impartiality, according to 
Smith, are strangers. Commercial societies are the societies in which one most oft en 
interacts with strangers. Commercial societies are societies of strangers (TMS 1.i.4.9: 23; 
see also  Seabright  2004 ) and so they seem to be the most eff ective locus to develop 
impartiality. Morality can therefore be seen as fl ourishing with the presence of 
 commerce, that is, Smith, yet again, promotes commerce on a moral ground. 
 What Smith says and whether Smith is correct or not are two separate questions. 
A discussion of whether Smith may be correct in his analysis is in the last section of the 
paper. For now let us see how the dependence of markets and morals is reciprocal and 
how, for Smith, not only markets foster some aspects of morality but morals foster some 
aspects of commercial societies. 
 Morality fostering markets 
 Adam Smith sees some positive moral eff ects coming from commerce, but he also sees 
that commerce requires some aspects of morality to develop and to grow. Evidence 
of this can be found in at least two places. One is in his analysis of the role of justice. 
Th e other is in his analysis of the consequences of the absence of morality in commerce: 
when agents do not behave morally, a commercial society is transformed into a deleteri-
ous and impoverishing mercantile system. 
 Th e role of justice in commerce (and in society in general) is straightforward. Smith 
claims that human societies cannot but be characterized by the presence of justice. 
A society without justice collapses. ‘Justice … is the main pillar that upholds the whole 
edifi ce. If it is removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society … must in a 
moment crumble into atoms’ (TMS II.ii.3.4: 86). Justice, Smith continues explaining, is a 
natural feature of human beings and therefore of human society. A society without justice 
is not a human society. Individuals would be ‘like wild beasts … and a man would enter an 
assembly of men as he enters a den of lions’ (TMS II.ii.3.4: 86; see also TMS II.ii.2.1: 83). 
 Th e analysis of how some aspects of morality foster markets by looking at the conse-
quences of their absence is more complex and depends on our innate desire to receive 
approbation ( Paganelli  2009a ). 
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 In Smith, approbation stems from two diff erent sources: appropriate moral conduct 
and the social status associated with the possession and parade of wealth. Th e approba-
tion generated from appropriate moral conduct generally gives us incentives to behave 
morally. Th e approbation generated from the parade of wealth gives us incentives to 
accumulate wealth (TMS I.iii.2.1: 50–1). But in contrast to our virtuous behaviours, 
wealth is visible and an easily recognizable sign of distinction. Th us, given the high rec-
ognizability of wealth and the diffi  culties with which virtue is distinguished from mor-
ally questionable behaviours, we tend to rely more on wealth than on virtue when we 
give approbation to others (TMS Vi.ii.1.20: 225–6). Similarly, for Smith, we rely more on 
wealth than on virtue when we seek approbation from others (see Tegos in this  volume 
and  Hont and Ignatieff   1983 ). 
 Th e more wealth one has, the more attention one attracts, and the more approbation 
one gains (TMS i.iii.3.4: 62–3). 3 For Smith, one admires the wealthy and aspires to 
become like them. But the great admiration for men of fortune may induce individuals 
to take great moral risks (TMS i.iii.3.8: 64–6). If the results of the morally questionable 
actions are positive, they gain the approbation from the easily recognizable higher level 
of wealth, and their diffi  cult to recognize immoral misbehaviours will most likely be 
ignored. For Smith, reproachable behaviours generate great admiration when the result-
ing gains are great, while they generate contempt if the gains are ‘petty’ as the increase in 
wealth is not enough to compensate for the decrease in approbation due to the immoral 
behaviour (TMS Vi.i.16: 217). What Smith is telling us, then, is that we are willing to trade 
approbation from moral behaviours for approbation from parading wealth. We are 
 willing to give up approbation from moral behaviours if we think that we can gain a lot 
of approbation from material possessions. Th e higher is the gain in approbation from 
material possessions, the more likely one is willing to behave in morally dubious ways to 
achieve it ( Levy  1999 ). 
 Following Smith, when the possibilities to gain approbation from wealth are large 
enough, they may incentivize more morally questionable actions and generate potentially 
disastrous consequences. And indeed, in commercial societies big merchants and manu-
facturers, given their desire to improve their image in the eyes of others, have opportuni-
ties to do so. Th e wealth generated by commerce is unprecedented and can be concentrated 
in their hands, if only the government grants them monopolies. Smith tells us that mer-
chants and manufacturers are willing to give up moral behaviours, using the coercive 
powers of the state, to increase their fortune and status at the expense of the rest of society. 
Th ey are willing to elbow their way over their competitors, even if these are reproachable 
behaviours, because with monopoly powers, they will gain much wealth and approba-
tion. Th e increase in personal wealth brings an increase in social approbation suffi  cient to 
outweigh any possible disapprobation for the methods used to achieve it. But, Smith also 
tells us, society will be deeply hurt and ‘both deceived and oppressed’ (WN I.xi.10: 267). 
 3  Smith ( 2013 ) presents a number of exceptions. Th e man of fashion need not be the wealthiest. 
Th e coxcomb might appear rich but not be. Th e noble might be admired but not be wealthy, the 
 nouveau riche might be scorned. 
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 So if we have markets with immoral behaviours, the consequences are potentially 
devastating for society. A commercial society is reshaped into a mercantile system. 
Smith believes mercantilist policies deform, distort, and impoverish society. Th ese are 
strong words:
 In her present condition, Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome bod-
ies in which some of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, 
are liable to many dangerous disorders scarce incident to those in which all the 
parts are more proportioned. A small stop in that great blood-vessel, which has 
been artifi cially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and through which an 
unnatural proportion of the industry and commerce of the country has been forced 
to circulate is very likely to bring on the most dangerous disorder upon the whole 
body politick. . . . Th e blood of which the circulation is stopt … in any of the greater 
vessels, convulsions, apoplexy, or death are the immediate and unavoidable conse-
quences. (WN IV.viii.c.43: 604–5) 
 Only commerce within its moral framework, not poverty nor the immoral mercantile 
system, brings about life. And therefore, life being a virtue to support, Smith highlights 
once again the positive link between commerce and some aspects of morality. 
 Smith goes on to explain the consequences of a broken link between commerce and 
morals. Th e system of justice that commerce generates becomes a system of brute injus-
tice when morality is ignored. Smith indeed tells us that ‘sometimes the interest of partic-
ular orders of men who tyrannize the government, warp the positive law of the country 
from what natural justice would prescribe’ (TMS VII. iv.36: 340–1), and that ‘[t]o hurt in 
any degree the interest of any one order of citizens, for no other purpose but to promote 
that of some other, is evidently contrary to that justice and equality of treatment which 
the sovereign owes to all the diff erent orders of his subjects’ (WN IV.viii.30: 654). And in 
Smith, this is exactly what some great merchants and manufacturers do when there are 
large profi t opportunities generated by government granted monopolies. Merchants and 
manufacturers become a threat to that system of justice through their ability to extort 
ferocious laws in favour of their own interests (WN IV.iii.c.10: 493–4 and WN IV.viii.53: 
661 among others). Mercantilist laws are far from just; indeed Smith likens them to the 
laws of Draco that ‘may be said to be all written in blood’ (WN IV.viii.17: 648). 
 According to Smith, Britain faces these negative forces from mercantile interests 
groups which use government’s coercion to extract benefi ts from themselves. Yet, her 
commerce is so strongly rooted that, despite such selfi sh and misguided legislation, the 
country is able to maintain a decent standard of living (WN IV.vii.c.47: 607–8 and WN 
IV.vii.c.50: 609). But, for Smith, the situation is not as fortunate where the mercantile 
system takes over a country where commerce does not have such deep roots. Bengal is 
the example Smith gives us. In Bengal
 many would not be able to fi nd employment even upon … hard terms, but would 
either starve, or be driven to seek subsistence either by begging, or by the perpetration 
perhaps of the greatest enormities. Want famine, and mortality would immediately 
prevail … till the number of inhabitants in the country was reduced to what could 
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 easily be maintained by the revenue and stock which remained in it, and which had 
escaped either the tyranny or calamity which had destroyed the rest. In [that] fertile 
country [of Bengal] which had before been much depopulated, three or four hundred 
thousand people die of hunger in one year. (WN I.viii.26: 91) 
 Bengal is in such dismal state because of the ‘mercantile company which oppresses and 
domineers in the East Indies’ (WN I.viii.26: 91). Commerce, given the correct moral 
framework that can develop along with it, generates and sustains life. Mercantilism, a 
degenerated form of commerce where the moral framework succumbs to avarice and 
venality, generates the death of both individuals and society. Commerce requires moral-
ity; mercantilism subverts it. 
 Negative consequences of markets 
on morality 
 Adam Smith is not a one-handed economist. He sees the potential negative eff ects of 
commerce as well as the positive ones. Smith is eloquent in describing how the intro-
duction of commerce may bring individuals to debauchery and to seek comfort from 
loneliness in vicious political or religious factions (WN V.i.g.12: 795–6; see Levy and 
Peart 2009), to which he suggests as remedies the ‘study of science and philosophy’ (WN 
V.i.g.14: 796) and ‘publick diversions’ (WN V.i.g.15: 796). He is eloquent in describing 
how commerce decreases the martial spirit of soldiers (WN V.i.f.50,59/782, 787; LJB 
331/540) and numbs the mind of some specialized workers (WN V.i.f.50: 782) to which 
he suggests as remedies basic education (WN V.i.f.51–61: 782–8). Tegos, Pack, and 
Rasmussen, in this volume presents a full account of the corruption of commerce on 
certain aspects of morality. Here I add a couple of further considerations Smith makes, 
indirectly, on the negative moral eff ects of commerce. 
 Despite subscribing to the idea, later called  doux commece , that commerce increases 
humanity, Smith does not believe commerce brings peace. On the contrary, Smith tells 
us the number and the length of unjust wars increases with the increase in the wealth 
brought about by commerce. Th e great merchants and manufacturers want to open 
new markets and are now willing and able to bring a country into war ‘for the sake of 
that little enhancement of price’ (WN IV.viii.53: 661). Th eir fellow-citizens, ‘who live 
in the capital, and in the provinces remote from the scene of action … enjoy, at their 
ease, the amusement of reading in the newspapers the exploits of their own fl eets and 
armies’, enjoying their dreams of empire (WN V.iii.37: 920). And the ability to debt 
fi nancing, which comes only with the wealth of commercial societies, allows the sov-
ereign, the great merchants and manufactures, and the fellow-citizens to disregard the 
high expenses of war. Th ey will not directly and immediately have to pay them, diff er-
ently from when a war is fi nanced by taxation when its expense is immediately and 
directly faced. 
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 Smith also analyses how the wealth of commerce brings about a sovereign’s morally 
irresponsible spending. Smith explains that the sovereign will squander his revenues of 
frivolous trinkets (WN V.iii.2–3: 908) during times of peace. When war comes, debt will 
be incurred, which ‘will in the long run probably ruin all the great nations of Europe’ 
(WN V.iii.10: 911). Smith is not too preoccupied by the presence of public debt though, 
because ‘if [commerce] commonly brings along with it the necessity of borrowing, it 
likewise brings along with it the facility of doing so’ (WN V.iii.5–6: 910). Yet, the possi-
bilities created by commerce include the irresponsible and immoral frivolous spending 
of the sovereign and the possible ruin of society. 
 A testable hypothesis 
 Adam Smith can be read as taking part in a larger conversation on the eff ects of 
 commerce on aspects of morality. In the eighteenth century the studies of the eff ects of 
commerce on human character and moral systems abounded. Albert Hirschman (1977) 
refers to as the  doux commerce the idea that the introduction of commerce changes the 
character and disposition of men, making them less violent and more sociable, as, 
among others, Montesquieu ([1748] 1989) and David Hume ([1752] 1985) suggest. 
Whether markets aff ect some moralit systems and how they do so is not a question fi rst 
asked in the eighteenth century. Th e relations between markets and moral systems have 
been analysed since antiquity. Typically it was believed markets aff ect morality, and they 
do it in a negative way. Merchants in classical Greece were typically not citizens. 
Commerce though necessary was liable to corrupt virtue, as a ‘means’ became an ‘end’. 
Up to the eighteenth century, the general attitude did not change much: market behav-
iour is a threat to some moral orders. But with the spread of commerce and the develop-
ment of commercial societies, markets are seen also as promoting all sorts of betterments, 
from material to moral, as Adam Smith testifi es. Since the seveneenth–eighteenth 
 century, markets have been seen as both promoters of the development of some moral 
systems or promoters of the degeneration of some other moral systems ( Berry  1994 ; 
 Clark  2007 ). But no consensus is present on whether the overall eff ect is positive or neg-
ative. Today we still face similar questions and generally we face similar disagreements 
( McCloskey  2006 ;  Zak  2008 ). Probably this lack of consensus comes, among other 
things, from the method of inquiry—speculation and anecdotal analysis. 
 Yet, in recent years we have been able to present the question of whether markets 
have a positive or negative eff ect at least on specifi c aspects of morality as a testable 
hypothesis. Th e development and growth of experimental economics allows us to test 
it both in the fi eld and in the laboratory. Th e results remain mixed, mostly because of 
the diffi  culty of designing a feasible experiment which captures the problem. So far, we 
have results showing that formal institutions such as markets may have an adverse 
eff ect on informal institutions and social norms (Frey 1997;  Deci et al.  1999 ;  Falk 
and Kosfeld  2006 ;  Reeson and Tisdell  2010 ), but in other laboratory studies,  Herrmann 
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et al. ( 2008 ) fi nd that cooperation is enhanced by exposure to markets. Using macro 
data,  Zak and Knack ( 2001 ) fi nd a strong relationship between the incidence of markets 
and formal institutions and generalized trust. 
 Th e experimental designs which most closely address the question of how markets 
aff ect specifi c aspects of morals come from Joseph  Henrich et al. ( 2004 ,  2010 ). Th eir 
work suggests that exposure to markets increases altruism. In particular in their cross-
cultural experiments, they show that giving in Ultimatum Games and Dictator Games is 
positively correlated with market integration, that is, to how much subjects are exposed 
to markets. In fact, exposure to markets is the strongest explanatory variable for their 
results. Exposure to markets is positively correlated to cooperative behaviours oft en 
associated to moral behaviour. 
 An Ultimatum Game is a game where there are two human players. As in all econom-
ics experiments, subjects voluntarily come to the experiments and are paid in local 
 currency the amount they earn by playing the experimental game. For each experiment, 
the number of participants is chosen so that the experimenter has enough observations 
to statistically analyse the results. In the standard Ultimatum Game, players’ anonymity 
is strictly preserved. Player 1 (Sender) receives an amount of money and is asked to send 
any amount of it to Player 2 (Receiver). Should the Receiver accept the Sender’s off er, the 
money is divided according to the terms of the off er. If the Receiver rejects the off er, 
both the Receiver and the Sender do not earn anything. In industrialized societies, 
 subjects consistently tend to split the amount 50/50 and tend to reject off ers that are less 
than 50 per cent (Guth and Tietz 1990; Roth et al. 1991; Camerer and Th aler 1995). 
A Dictator Game is a modifi ed Ultimatum Game. In the Dictator Game, the Sender 
(Dictator) faces the same choice as in the Ultimatum Game: choose how much of the 
money given to her/him to send to her/his anonymously paired Receiver. But here, the 
Receiver cannot reject the off er of the Sender. Th e Receiver must take what the Dictator 
sends without any possibility of rejection. Here, the possibility that the choice of the 
Sender could be motivated by strategic behaviour intended to decrease the risk of rejec-
tion is eliminated by design. If a Sender sends a positive amount to the Receiver, s/he 
would be motivated only by other-regarding preferences. In industrialized countries, 
consistently 20–30 per cent of the Senders give 50 per cent, while 30 per cent of the 
Senders take the whole pot (Roth et al. 1991; Forsythe et al. 1994;  Henrich et al.  2004 ). 
Th e average giving is around 30 per cent. 
 In 2000, Joseph Henrich started a series of fi eld experiments across the globe using 
members of small-scale societies with a broad variety of economic and cultural condi-
tions as subjects. His results, and the results of his colleagues, are diff erent from the 
homogeneous results of industrialized countries (Henich et al. 2004). Fairness seems to 
vary cross-culturally. Th e modal Ultimatum Game off ers from the sample of the 15 for-
aging societies studied ranged from 15 to 50 per cent. Rejection rates are much lower 
than those observed in industrialized countries. Trying to control for possible explana-
tory variables, Henrich et al. found that two variables account for a signifi cant part 
(47 per cent) of the variation between groups. Th ese variables are ‘market integration’ (that 
is, do people engage frequently in market exchange?) and ‘cooperation in production’ 
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(that is, what are the potential benefi ts to cooperative as opposed to solitary or family 
based productive activities?). Th e higher the level of market integration, the higher the 
level of cooperation and sharing in the experimental games. It seems that market pro-
motes cooperation and fairness. Intrigued by these ‘counterintuitive’ results,  Henrich 
et al. ( 2010 ) went in the fi eld again, and using another set of 15 small-scale societies 
explicitly tests the previous results again. Th e original fi ndings are confi rmed and rein-
forced. Market integration is the most powerful explanatory variable for changes in the 
amount given in both games. Adam Smith’s claim that some aspects of moral behaviour 
are a result of markets seems to have an empirical support. 
 Additionally, Omar  Al-Ubaydli et al. (forthcoming  2013 ), using randomized control 
laboratory experiments, shows that market exposure has a positive and signifi cant eff ect 
on trust and a positive yet negligible eff ect on trustworthiness. Al-Ubaydli and his col-
leagues use the Trust Game and the psychology technique of priming. In a Trust (or ‘gift  
exchange’) Game, Player 1 can either keep a fi xed sum of money or send part of it to 
Player 2, who will receive the amount sent multiplied by a predetermined factor. Player 2 
can then take all of what s/he received and leave Player 1 with whatever s/he did not 
send, or send back some of the money to Player 1. Th e observed ‘returns to trust’ tend to 
be positive (Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Reidl 1993; Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995). With 
Al-Ubaydli’s design, subjects are randomly and unconsciously primed to think about 
markets and trade. Th ey are then asked to play a Trust Game involving an anonymous 
stranger. Th e behaviour of these individuals is compared with that of a group who are 
not primed to think about anything in particular. Al-Ubaydli’s fi nding is that priming 
for market participation aff ects positively the beliefs about the trustworthiness of anon-
ymous strangers, increasing trust. Again Adam Smith seems to have found empirical 
support for his justifi cations of markets on a moral ground. 
 Another way of seeing this is that when the hypothesis that markets have positive 
eff ects on morals is tested, and the closer is the design of the experiment to the hypothe-
sis, there seems to be an increasing amount of evidence to support it. Th e question that is 
not tested or answered yet in the current experimental literature is  how markets gener-
ate this positive eff ect on at least some aspects of morals. Th is is where the eighteenth-
century scholarship and of Adam Smith in particular become relevant. 
 Th e way Smith explains our moral development can explain why subjects in Ultimatum 
and Dictator Games are willing to share as much as they do with an unknown other. Th e 
way Smith explains our moral development in relation with commerce can also explain 
why subjects exposed to markets generally give more in Ultimatum and Dictator Games 
than subjects who are not as much exposed to markets ( Paganelli  2009b ). 
 Additionally, according to Smith, as we start dealing with strangers, we start needing 
rules to govern our interactions. Th e institutionalization of rules of just conduct reinforces 
the cooperation among individuals providing a benefi cial feedback loop (see also  Ostrom 
 1998 ). Th e opportunity to trade with strangers allows individuals to learn more easily how 
to interact with others in a fairer way, without being exclusively motivated by fear of retalia-
tion. Th e opportunity to trade with strangers also allows for the generation of institutions 
that facilitate cooperation, which in their turn facilitate the internalization of cooperation. 
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Indeed, in the absence of markets, interactions with strangers (‘outsiders’) are characterized 
by danger, exploitation, and mistrust ( Henrich et al.  2010 ), and are therefore avoided. 
Commerce breaks the boundaries of small and closed communities. Commercial societies 
allow for fruitful exchanges with strangers and strangers begin to be associated with posi-
tive outcomes thanks also to the development of institutions which facilitate these exchanges 
( North  1990 and  Ostrom  1998 ). Th e result is the weakening of a set of moral values and the 
strengthening of a diff erent set of moral values. Some moral behaviours are enhanced even 
in the settings where there is no threat of punishment for devious behaviour. Commerce 
therefore reduces the cost of the development of impartiality and increases how relevant 
cooperation with anonymous strangers is in our life, and it may allow us to make that leap of 
faith required to trust strangers as trustworthy. Th e strong positive correlation between 
growth and trust  Zak and Knack ( 2001 ) fi nd may be part of this story. 
 As trust may increase economic growth, economic growth may increase trust. Adam 
Smith suggests indeed the more one trades the more honest one becomes, a  doux commerce 
argument. Th e incentives to cheat decrease since one realizes of the potential long-term 
gains of honesty (LJB 205: 487; WN III.iv.3: 411; see  Young  2001 ). Similarly, as his contem-
porary and friend David Hume claims, countries where commerce is introduced and sus-
tained grow honesty and extinguish corruption. Hume’s evidence? Poland: ‘a country where 
venality and corruption … prevail. Th e nobles seem to have preserved their crown elective 
for no other purpose, than regularly sell it to the highest bidder. Th is is almost the only spe-
cies of commerce, with which that people are acquainted’ (Hume [1752] 1985: 276). 
 It seems therefore, for Smith, ‘ethical maturation is an ongoing process because the 
ideal is a limit—we can forever refi ne our values as we approach it, but we can never 
achieve it’ ( Evensky  2005 : 47). Jerry Evensky indeed describes Smith as telling the story 
of the co-evolution of individuals and social norms of ethics, a story in which not only 
change but progress occurs. ‘In this story, human nature is constant (we are not “better” 
than our predecessor), but human character evolves along with human institutions, and 
these have the capacity to mature toward the ideal’ (56). Th e presence of commerce 
would indeed generate that moral environment that would fi t in the story of co-evolution 
and maturity towards the ideal. Th is story fi ts our experimental results. Henrich (2004, 
2010) and his team open the door to empirical cross-cultural studies where the variable 
with the highest explanatory power is market integration; Al-Ubaydli (forthcoming 
2013) and his  colleagues open the door to randomized control where trust and trustwor-
thiness increase with market exposure; and Smith and other eighteenth-century schol-
ars may provide the theoretical explanations for these results. 
 Conclusion 
 Adam Smith favours commerce on grounds of both morality and effi  ciency. Commerce 
is intertwined with morals, it supports moral development and at the same time it is 
supported by it. Commerce requires morals for its functioning and gives the conditions 
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under which people can live, can live freely, and can live morally. Th e wealth generated 
by commerce may not only support life, but also endanger it. It may generate incentives to 
lobby for the establishment of monopolies which benefi t a few at the expense of the many, 
it may generate incentives to cause and prolong wars, it may generate incentives to weaken 
a country martial spirit, and to numb the mind of some workers. Smith  recognizes both 
positive and negative eff ects commerce on morals. Yet, on balance, he recognizes the posi-
tive eff ects outweigh the negative. Today there is increasing empirical support for the posi-
tive eff ects of markets on morals, coming from the laboratory and the fi eld. And there is a 
coherent explanation for why that may be the case which comes from Adam Smith. 
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